Abstract-While demand response programs achieve energy efficiency and quality objectives, they bring potential security threats into the Smart Grid. An ability to influence load in the system provides the capability for an attacker to cause system failures and impacts the quality and integrity of the power delivered to customers. This paper presents a security mechanism that monitors and controls load according to security policies during normal system operation. The mechanism monitors, detects, and responds to load altering attacks. The authors examined security requirements of Smart Grid stakeholders and constructed a set of load control policies enforced by the mechanism. A proof of concept prototype was implemented and tested using the simulation environment. By enforcing the proposed policies in this prototype, the system is maintained in a safe state in the presence of load drop attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand side management and load shaping programs modify the load curve shape of customers by deliberate utility intervention. One of the most common programs is direct load control (DLC) in which a portion of the load (e.g., air conditioning, pool pumps) is under the direct control of the utility. An alternative to DLC is indirect load control, which allows customers to control their loads independently according to the price signals that are sent by utilities. While these programs are intended to achieve various energy efficiency and quality objectives, they can also introduce potential problems into the Smart Grid.
Abruptly dropping the load at certain locations in the grid can cause power quality violations and system failures [1] . Similarly, rapid increase of the load can result in substantial economic costs due to the need to pull power from other regions to meet increased demand, power quality violations and system failures.
The load altering attacks against smart power grids can be categorized as direct and indirect attacks:
1. Direct: fabricating the command messages to affect direct load control command signals, such as switch on/switch off commands. By simultaneously sending fabricated switch on/off signals to a large number of loads the attacker can cause a major spike or drop in the aggregate load demand.
This can be achieved in two ways: (1) remote disconnect through AMI and (2) direct load control through DR.
2. Indirect: load altering attacks can be triggered by false price injection. By compromising the price signals, the attacker can plan to simultaneously change the energy consumption program in hundreds or thousands of residences and cause major changes in the load profile (increase or decrease). Internet-based load altering attacks against smart power grids can take place in a variety of scenarios.
A key infrastructure component used to automate demand response (DR) programs is the Demand Response Automation Server (DRAS). Figure 1 depicts a conceptual overview of Automated DR infrastructure [7] . By compromising the control services (e.g., DRAS) and related Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) services, an attacker can send authenticated commands to meters without a need to compromise the meters or communications network. In particular, the adversary can execute the following attacks:
1. Send a sequence of service disconnect commands to aggregators and individual customer meters. This is a direct load drop attack that can cause power quality violations and system failures.
2. Send a sequence of service connect commands to aggregators and customer meters. This is a direct load increase attack that can result in substantial economic costs due to the need to pull power from other regions to meet increased demand, power quality violations and system failures.
3. Broadcast DR Critical Peak Pricing event with very high tariff. This is an indirect load drop attack that can cause power quality violations and system failures.
4. Broadcast Real Time Pricing event with very low tariff. This is an indirect load increase attack that can result in considerable economic costs due to the need to pull power from other regions to meet increased demand, power quality violations and system failures. This paper presents the Policy Server -a security mechanism that attempts to address the above issues. The mechanism performs the following functions:
1. Monitor DR and AMI commands 2. Control load according to a set of security policies during normal system operation 3. Detect abnormal situations and load altering attacks 4. Respond to the load altering attacks The mechanism evaluates received DR and AMI commands to determine whether to authorize the commands and initiate response actions if the system is approaching critical states. This assessment involves evaluation of hierarchical set of policies. This work examined security requirements and conducted policy analysis related to load control and defined a set of load control policies evaluated by the Policy Server. A proof of concept prototype was implemented and evaluated using the simulation environment described in [1] . By enforcing the proposed policies in this prototype, the system is maintained in a safe state in the presence of load drop attacks.
II. RELATED WORK
A number of researchers explored policy-based approaches to the Smart grid management. Tabors et al. [16] discussed the interrelationship between that market, customers, and power suppliers and note the significant attention on technology and interoperability and insufficient focus on market structure and market operability. Before new Smart grid systems are widely deployed, the rules of engagement will have to be carefully crafted to find solutions beneficial to consumers and to the suppliers. In [13] Koutsopoulos et al. presented a thresholdbased control policy for optimal energy storage management. The policy attempts to maintain balanced power consumption by adaptively charging (increases power consumption from the grid) or discharging (satisfies part of the grid demand) of the storage device. In [17] Fouda et al. proposed demand control policy that uses different grades assigned to demand requests for effective management of the power consumption. The authors employed computer simulations to evaluate the performance and demonstrate the effectiveness the proposed policy method.
A number of recent publications have attempted to address the risk of cyber-and cyber-physical attacks against metering infrastructure. In [10] Liu et. al described false data injection attacks against state estimation in power grids. This work demonstrated the success attacks that not only change the results of state estimation, but also modify them. In addition to physical attacks that employ tempering with control signals or grid components, several types of load altering attacks have been discussed in [2, 3] .
Topological attacks are cyber physical attacks that alter the physical dynamics of the power network by removing bus interconnections have been considered in [12] . In [6] Pasqualetti et al. authorsproposed a theoretical framework for modeling cyber-physical systems, attacks, and attack detection monitors. In [11] Neuman and Tan described the threat propagation between physical and cyber domains.
Lin et al. [14] investigated the vulnerability of distributed energy distribution and investigated novel false data injection attacks that manipulate quantity of energy supply and response, and the link state of energy transmission. Attack simulation demonstrated that such attacks can considerably disrupt the energy distribution process.
Mo and Sinopoli [15] studied false data injection attacks (necessary and sufficient condition to destabilize the system) and defensive methods to improve the resilience of the system using Kalman Filter and LQG controller.
In [18] Yang et al. studied the false data-injection attacks and corresponding countermeasures. In particular, they developed optimal attack strategy that selects a set of meters to cause the maximum damage. To defend against such attacks they proposed two approaches: (1) protect critical sensors and make the system more resilient to attacks and (2) spatial-and temporal-based detection scheme.
The work presented in this paper concentrates on a policy based approach to load altering attack detection and mitigation efforts not studied by the cited research.
III. LOAD CONTROL POLICIES FOR SMART GRID
Policies that govern Smart grid infrastructure are complex due to a number of involved stakeholders and sources of regulatory controls (e.g., NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection, privacy laws, etc.). Fig. 2 depicts a process whereby concrete (i.e., the policies to be enforced by the system) security policies are produced. Utility, Third Parties, and Customers adopt policies that comply with the Government Regulators' requirements and guidelines. Utility, Third Parties, and Customers establish trust relationships in a form of contracts/agreements, so concrete policies comply with these contracts. The paper next briefly describes essential requirements and concrete policies related to the load control. 2. Power quality policies. Delivered voltage is required to stay in the range 0.9 pu < V < 1.1 pu. System frequency is required to stay within +/-0.10 Hz of nominal. The consequences of operating outside of power quality requirements include damage to or degradation of customer and utility equipment.
Government Regulator Requirements
3. Normal operation policies define constrains on normal operational behavior. Investigation is required if observed behavior falls outside these constraints but that does not rise to violations of power quality and safety policies.
4. Load balancing policies. Power operations contingency plans include pulling power from other regions when generation is insufficient to meet demand. Policies can specify energy price constrains that define maximum acceptable price range as well as energy amount for buying energy from other regions in such cases.
5. Business continuity policies necessitate business activities to function even during cyber-attacks. Such policy may require, for example, DRAS to be constantly operating.
Customer Policies
1. DR opt-in/opt-out preferences that are uploaded to a utility/ISO information system for DR application. If customer selects opt-out, no direct connect/disconnect commands as well as DR event notifications should reach the customer.
2. Building level policies: certain parts of the buildings (e.g., medical facilities) should receive guaranteed power quality to support acceptable levels of lighting, temperature, humidity etc.
3. Price threshold at which to reduce demand -should prices reach or exceed this level, the demand response must be dispatched.
Third Party Policies
Third-party contractors, such as aggregators, can combine loads from certain utilities and make them available for demand response, thus acting as intermediaries between utilities and customers. Third Parties comply with contractual obligations and regulations by enforcing the policies defined by the Utilities (e.g., provide the contracted demand reduction) and Customers (e.g., enforce price threshold at which to reduce demand).
IV. DESIGN DETAILS
The Policy Server observes transmitted direct connect /disconnect commands, critical peak events, DR commands and price signals originated by DRAS and sent through AMI infrastructure as well as acknowledgements to DR command signals received through AMI. Policy server can be replicated and deployed in different domains as shown in Fig.1 .
Under normal (non-attack) system operation, the Policy server is consulted (e.g., by DRAS) in order to enforce the load control policies before sending an AMI/DR command(s). To determine whether an AMI/DR command is authorized, Policy server evaluates all relevant stakeholders' policies as shown in Fig.3 . Note that the policy enforcement can be accomplished in a distributed fashion. For example, enforcement of customer policies can be delegated to an aggregator. In this case, the Policy server at the aggregator's cite will determine whether a command authorized by a Policy Server at the Utility or DR cite should be forwarded to specific clients.
If the Policy server determines that the system is approaching dangerous state (Safety, Power quality, or Normal operation policies are about to be violated), it activates response actions, such as:
Notify operator about ongoing dangerous load drop/increase event involving particular Region(s) Drop suspicious messages/commands coming from compromised DRAS by reconfiguring firewall rules Shut down the DRAS server if Business continuity policies do not prohibit it The response actions are also executed in a distributed manner.
The reminder of this paper will discuss the implementation and testing of the power safety, quality and normal operation policies, and their effectiveness against load drop attacks in a simulated environment. Fig. 4 shows concrete safety, power quality (purple line), and normal operation (green line) policies for a load drop attack scenario and two direct load drop attacks. The policies define the boundaries between the three operational regions and demonstrate the correlation between the system variables: the amount of load dropped and time over which load dropped in one hand and the system failure effects on the other hand. The authors used the methods and data sources described in [1] to: (1) construct a cyber-physical model of an AMI system connected to a power system, (2) measure the integrated system sensitivity to load drop attacks, and (3) develop the safety, power quality, and normal operation policies for a load drop attack scenario for a modeled region.
The authors used simulation (i.e. PowerWorld) to get the value of safety policy P(t). Specifically, the sensitivity analysis was used to get this value. Note that both the value of power quality policy Q and that of normal operation policy N are very small. For normal operation, the frequency is required to stay within 60.03Hz, and for power violation it is required to stay within 60.1Hz. This is a small margin for frequency. A small change in load will cause this change in frequency. This is the power system issue that the authors discovered from the simulations. Power simulations details are described in the next Section.
In our model a region represents a set of smart meters served by a given generator. The modeled region consists of 457 neighborhoods. Number and average load ratings of the three customer types for a modeled neighborhood were derived from average numbers for the entire Los Angeles Department of Water and Power service area [9] . Each customer in the modeled service area is assumed to have a single smart meter.
Each AMI/DR command includes send time and meter ID. Based on the meter Id Policy server determines the region the meter belongs to and a type of customer. Based on the type of customer and region, the server predicts load drop for each meter that will result in execution of disconnect command. The predicted load drop value is calculated based on the values in Table 1 . The time of the effect of the command is assumed to be the send time.
To identify whether the system is in a safe region for the direct load drop case for each DR direct load drop command received at time ti two conditions must hold:
1. D(ti) < P(0) defines maximum acceptable load drop completed at once.
2. defines the total load drop that involves loads of all meters that are turned off before and at time ti. P(t) -function defined for each region that represents safety policies. It approximates the maximum load that can be safely dropped within time t in certain region.
D(ti)
-total load drop at time ti, represents the sum of dropped loads of all meters that are disconnected at time ti.
The algorithm uses sliding window command stream monitoring approach with window_size = te -ts. The window size is determined by the start time ts and end time te: The start time is a certain time ts > 0 in the past that indicates a time boundary to safely discard all observed commands with a time stamps tj < ts . The window end time te is calculated based on the state of the system. We assume that t e is the time required for the system to get back to its normal state after an event (e.g., DR event) after which previous events can be safely discarded. For example, if a DR event causes the frequency of the system to fluctuate, then the mechanism waits for the system to get to back its normal frequency (which is 60 Hz) before discarding previous events. The algorithm uses the window size of 100 seconds, so te = ts + 100. A threshold can be added to the above formula in order to report policy violation before it reaches critical value.
Similar approach is used to detect violations of power quality and normal operation policies: function P(t) is replaced with the Q = 1.94% and N = 0.65% constants shown in Fig.4 .
To test the Policy server the authors executed a number of direct load drop attack scenarios following the procedure described in [1] . Fig. 4 shows two attack scenarios fast (red) and slow (blue). An attack generates a series of service disconnect commands in a round robin fashion (originating from the DRAS) addressed to each meter in a single neighborhood. Predicted load drop in one round robin cycle is aggregated (i.e. the load connected to a single meter in each neighborhood). The time spacing between two subsequent command rounds was fixed at 150 milliseconds. Slow attack targets first Industrial next Commercial and finally Residential customers. The order is reversed for the slow attack execution. The Policy server detects violations of the policies and initiates response measures briefly outlined above. The response is not shown in Fig.4 . 
Customer Type Region Energy Customer Model

V. POWER SIMULATION DETAILS
Power Model: The power system is simulated using the IEEE 9-bus, 3-machine test model, shown in Figure 5 . This model is used frequently in the literature for stability and frequency control analysis. Starting with the PowerWorld library version of the IEEE 9-bus model, the model was configured to include [1] : IEEET1 for the exciter, TGOV1 for the governor and IEEL for the load.
To provide semi-realistic stability in the model, overfrequency protection was enabled with a threshold of 61.80 Hz and a pickup of 0.25 seconds [2] , and under-frequency protection was enabled with a threshold of 57.60 Hz and a pickup of 2 seconds. 
Sensitivity Analysis:
The policy engine needs to correlate between the system variables and the failure effects on the system in order to make its decisions. The transient stability add-on in PowerWorld was used to implement this analysis (the same analysis was used by AlMajali et al. [1] and Rice et al. [3] ). Two inputs were varied to inject a load drop in the simulations: 1) the amount of load dropped which was varied between 20% and 80% of the total load in the system; 2) the duration over which the load was dropped was varied between 0 and 100 seconds. As characterized by Rice et al. [3] , the failure effects on the system can be divided to four categories:
1. System shutdown: All generators in the power model tripped as a result of over-frequency protection. This is measured as zero power output from all generators at the end of the simulation. This case corresponds to the violation of Safety policy P(t) depicted in Fig.4. 2. Power quality violation: As defined in IEEE 1159-2009, system frequency is required to stay within ±0.10 Hz of nominal. Operating outside this range may results in electrical equipment damage (i.e. 60.10 Hz < frequency < 61.80 Hz). This case corresponds to the violation of Power Quality policy Q shown in Fig.4. 3. Anomalous operation: In this category the system is not operating within its normal operation range but still not violating standards (i.e. 60.03 Hz < frequency < 60.1 Hz). This case corresponds to the violation of Normal operation policy N depicted in Fig.4. 4. Normal operation: In this category the system is within it normal operation range (i.e. ± 0.03 Hz).
VI. DISCUSSION
This paper studied load drop attack scenarios. The next step is to study direct load increase attacks. There are some issues that can make this attack ineffective. If a meter is disconnected from the grid, than this most likely means that no load is attached to it (e.g., the apartment is empty because someone moved out). Therefore, sending a remote connect command that will connect the meter may not increase the load. The analysis requires estimation of the percentage of disconnected meters with loads out of the whole number of meters.
DR programs offer customers the opportunity to reduce demand in response to a price signal or financial incentive. A DR event is defined as, "The time periods, deadlines and transitions during which Demand Resources perform." [4] Typically the request to reduce demand is made for a specific time period on a specific day which is referred to as a demand response event. Each event has three key measurement components [5] depicted in Fig. 6 :
Load Reduction = Baseline Demand -Actual Demand Baseline -The amount of energy the customer would have consumed absent a request to reduce.
Actual Use -The amount of energy the customer actually consumed during the event period.
Load Reduction -The mathematical difference between the baseline and the actual use.
The load reduction value can be used to estimate potential change in load during a DR event and determine whether it poses risks such as violation of safety, power quality and normal operation policies. , where D(ti) represents the sum of load reduction values of all meters that are executed at time ti, ts is event deployment time and te is reduction deadline time. Due to inability to acquire actual customer load reduction data for our modelled region, we experimented with simulated data.
The safety policy violation requires 70% load reduction to be executed by 100% of the industrial, commercial and residential customers, which may not be realistic. However, power quality violations are observed at 10% load reduction on behalf of 20% of the customers making this threat quite feasible.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a security mechanism that monitors and evaluates DR and AMI commands to determine whether to authorize the commands and initiate response actions if the system is approaching critical states. The detection is based on a set of security policies that express the security requirements defined by various Smart Grid stakeholders. The authors implemented a proof of concept prototype and evaluated it effectiveness to detect and respond to direct load drop attacks using the simulation environment.
The simulation environment that was used took into consideration frequency violations. However, this environment can be enhanced by considering other types of violations like voltage. By enhancing the simulation environment, the results of validating the model can be more reliable. Sophisticated simulation tools that are run by utilities can be used to implement more accurate and reliable tests of this model.
The future work involves studying direct load increase attacks. Simulation of the load increase attack scenario is more complicated because it involves other protection mechanisms beside generator governors like Under Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS) and Under Frequency Generator Protection (UFGP) [8] . Indirect load drop and increase attack scenarios require further examination to determine potential feasibility of such attacks and understanding of conditions that contribute to the effectiveness of the attacks.
